The Curse of the Silent Majority
We study a model of elections in which some voters belong to social groups, such as churches, clubs, unions, and social-media networks, through which they can coordinate turnout, while unaffiliated voters decide independently. We identify weak conditions under which unaffiliated voters find it strictly optimal to abstain, leaving the electoral outcome to organized groups. We call this phenomenon the “Curse of the Silent Majority,” because even when unaffiliated voters constitute a majority and have stronger preferences, the candidate supported by the organized minority wins with high probability. We show theoretically that this form of group voting can account for empirical regularities that are difficult to explain using models of individual-based turnout decisions, particularly the frequent occurrence of large margins of victory, including in high-turnout elections. We then assess the quantitative relevance of this mechanism by structurally estimating the model using data from Texas liquor referenda. The estimates underscore the importance of organized groups in explaining voter turnout and electoral margins and provide new insights into the social organizations that shape electoral outcomes.
Keywords: Voter turnout; Electoral Equilibrium; Group-based Voting